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Abstract
This is a response to Ásgeir Tryggvason’s argument that the deliberative critique of the agonistic
approach to citizenship education is based on a misreading of the main concepts in agonistic theory—
a misreading that has important implications for any attempt to bring closer agonism and deliberation in citizenship education. My aim in this response is to offer some clarifying comments and
questions and suggest some further ideas for expanding Tryggvason’s analysis, highlighting in particular two perspectives that, in my view, deserve further attention in citizenship education: first, the
consequences of cultivating agonistic emotions in the classroom; and, second, the possibilities and
limitations of acknowledging what has been called “affective citizenship” as an important element of
citizenship education. My response concludes by discussing how affective citizenship education illuminates the debate between agonists and deliberators.
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T

ryggvason’s (2018) paper came at a time when
there is an increasing interest in citizenship education about the role affect and emotion play in
discussing difficult and controversial issues in the classroom. The
arguments for and against the place of emotions in citizenship
education are not new, of course; they have been debated for some
time. On one hand, there is the argument that emotions are central
in an agonistic approach to citizenship education because emotions
are considered an essential aspect of political and democratic life.
On the other hand, the deliberative perspective—certainly not a
monolithic one—puts emphasis on reason and rational argumentation; therefore, emotions are not trusted to have a legitimate place
in political discussions in the classroom. In his paper, Tryggvason
offered a compelling review and analysis of these arguments,
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drawing on the differences and similarities between deliberative
education and agonistic education. Tryggvason argued that
agonism (which is often grounded in Mouffe’s theory of agonistic
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pluralism) and deliberation (which includes a variety of perspectives that do not amount a single body of principles) are joint in the
critique of essentialist identities and person-oriented emotions
within education. However, Tryggvason wrote, an attempt “to
assimilate agonism with deliberation in citizenship education
cannot be successful if the notion of agonism stems from Mouffe’s
theory of agonistic pluralism [but rather] an assimilation of this
kind would have to be based on other notions and definitions of
agonism if it is successful” (p. 7). Tryggvason went on to suggest a
“tamed version” (p. 7) of agonism as a link to deliberation.
Tryggvason’s (2018) analysis that the deliberative critique of
the agonistic approach to citizenship education is based on a
misreading of the main concepts in agonistic theory is extremely
valuable, because this misreading has indeed important implications for any attempt to bring closer agonism and deliberation in
citizenship education. My aim in this response is to offer some
clarifying comments and questions and suggest some further ideas
for expanding Tryggvason’s analysis, highlighting in particular two
perspectives that, in my view, deserve further attention in considering citizenship education and agonism: first, the consequences of
cultivating agonistic emotions in the classroom and, second, the
possibilities and limitations of acknowledging what has been called
affective citizenship (Fortier, 2010, 2016; Johnson, 2010; Mookherjee, 2005) as an important element of citizenship education
(Zembylas, 2014, 2015), particularly in relation to how affective
citizenship education illuminates the debate between agonists and
deliberators.

Summary of the Original Argument
Tryggvason (2018) began his article by asking several questions,
among which was what role students’ identities and emotions
should play in political discussions in the classroom. To respond to
this question, the paper examined two prominent approaches in
citizenship education during the last two decades: deliberative
education and agonistic education. As Tryggvason explained, the
deliberative ideal and the agonistic ideal promote different views of
classroom discussions. On one hand, the deliberative ideal
emphasizes that conflict of opinions should be transcended, and
thus, discussions should aim at cultivating rational deliberation
and reaching some sort of consensus. On the other hand, the
agonistic ideal emphasizes the political dimension of conflicts,
which implies that conflicts between opinions cannot be reduced
to rational deliberation but are unavoidably entangled with
participants’ identities and emotions (Ruitenberg, 2009; Zembylas,
2014, 2015). Tryggvason focused on exploring the deliberative
critique from the vantage point of agonism, rightly pointing out
that as far as the assumptions made about identities and emotions,
the deliberative critique of agonism is unfounded and based on a
misreading of Mouffe’s agonistic theory.
To advance this position, the paper has four main parts. In the
first part, Tryggvason (2018) discussed how deliberative education
has generally handled emotions in classroom discussions, highlighting that deliberative approaches have underestimated the
importance of emotions. At the same time, Tryggvason acknowledged that there are scholars in contemporary deliberative theory
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who attempt to address this critique by acknowledging the
importance of introducing controversial and emotionally charged
topics into the classroom. In the second part of the paper, Tryggvason’s point of departure was Ruitenberg’s (2009) outline of an
agonistic approach in which the role of political emotions is
highlighted. Tryggvason identified that a central aspect of this
approach—which is grounded in Mouffe’s (2005) theory of
agonistic pluralism—is the destabilization of essentialist identities.
This idea suggests that the agonistic approach recognizes the
importance of sustaining the political in emotions, conflicts, and
identities; it is, therefore, emphasized that there is no escape from
political emotions in classroom discussions. Political emotions are
generally understood as those emotions that are directed toward a
societal object, such as homelessness, compared to moral emotions
that are directed toward a personal or interpersonal object
(Ruitenberg, 2009).
The third part of the paper took on the relation between
identities and political issues. The deliberative perspective is
concerned that conflicts can easily become clashes between
individuals because the agonistic approach creates space for the
different (e.g., ethnic) identities of the persons involved by
allowing political emotions in a discussion. However, this claim,
Tryggvason (2018) correctly pointed out, is grounded in the false
assumption that there is a sharp distinction between identities and
political issues, whereas it is not necessary that conflicts must stay
framed in identity-based terms. In this manner, Tryggvason made
an important point, namely, that the deliberative position rests on
erroneous assumptions about the agonistic conception of identities, especially the claim that agonism emphasizes essentialist
identities. As it was reiterated, understanding of identities and
political issues within an agonistic frame does not have to be
framed in essentialist terms (see Zembylas, 2011).
In the last part of the paper, Tryggvason (2018) argued that
there is room for political emotions in the classroom, but this has
to take place under certain conditions, namely, an agonistic
understanding of emotions has to be compatible with the deliberative perspective. However, there are problems with assimilating
agonism and deliberation because “the idea of agonism as a link to
deliberation is not compatible with Mouffe’s theory of agonism”
(p. 7). Therefore, there has to be, Tryggvason argued, a “tamed
version” (p. 7) of agonism that recognizes deliberation as agonism
(which is not antagonism). Yet it is clear that “educating students to
become active democratic citizens could mean different things if
the teacher takes an agonistic or a deliberative stance” (p. 8).
Tryggvason emphasized the point that commitment in the
deliberation process is not just a rational understanding but an
emotional involvement—which is the agonistic approach’s
position—yet the issue is not further developed. But why is this
point so important, especially in citizenship education? Or, to put
it differently, what are the consequences of cultivating agonistic
emotions (e.g., commitment, hope, etc.) in political discussions in
the classroom?
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The Consequences of Cultivating Agonistic Emotions in the
Classroom
At the heart of agonistic emotions is the idea that affect and
emotion play an important role in nourishing the ethico-political
principles that democracies are based on (Mihai, 2014). For
example, an account of agonistic emotion that can sustain the
political project of Mouffe’s democratic theory emphasizes
that democratic emotions are fundamental elements of agonistic
democracies. For Mouffe, pluralist democracy is conceived in a
way that does not deny the antagonistic dimension but rather turns
antagonistic confrontations into agonistic ones (Mouffe, 2005,
2014). An agonistic relation is one that, while preserving the reality
of conflict, puts limits on what political agents can do to each other
(Mihai, 2014); in Mouffe’s (2005) terms, opponents are adversaries
rather than enemies. In his analysis of Mouffe’s approach,
Tryggvason pointed out that a form of citizenship education that
embraces this agonistic approach would also embrace the role of
political emotions. Tryggvason’s analysis provides fertile ground
for extending the debate between agonists and deliberators about
political education. An interesting question emerging from
Tryggvason’s discussion is: What happens in citizenship education
when educators and students adopt the emotions that Mouffe
advocates?
Before responding to this question, it is important first to
clarify how political emotions are understood in the original piece.
In general, there are the following indications about emotions in
Tryggvason’s (2018, p. 6) analysis:
1. Emotions not only are person-oriented but have a social
and political dimension (e.g., political hope, political
resentment).
2. A strong rationalistic framework of emotions that makes
a clear distinction between political and moral emotions
is problematic.
3. A definition of political emotions that takes as its starting
point the object toward which the emotion is directed is a
problematic way of discerning whether it is a political
emotion or not.
4. Emotions (e.g., in the classroom) can be made compatible
(or not) with the ethico-political values of liberty and
equality.
The above indications allude to what Mihai (2014)—whom
Tryggvason cited several times throughout his essay—called a
weak constructivist cognitivist approach, in reference to Mouffe’s
approach toward emotions. This approach is grounded in the
following (certainly nonexhaustive list of) assumptions. The
indications that roughly correspond to each follow:
1. Sociality, politics, and emotions are entangled; the
conception of emotion and politics implied here seems to
be that of a constructivist perspective (e.g., Kemper, 1990,
2006); namely, emotions become elaborated as social and
political meanings in conditions of interaction and social
organization (indications 1, 3).
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2. Emotions are not irrational passions that “contaminate”
reason; therefore, any distinctions that render emotions
as less rational are problematic (Armon-Jones, 2003)
(indication 2).
3. Emotions are similar to judgments in many ways because
they express values and they reveal how we see the world
(de Sousa, 1987; Solomon, 1988) (indication 4).
4. Emotions can be subjected to critical appraisal and
evaluation, and therefore, it is possible to generate
emotions that are compatible to certain values and
judgments (Armon-Jones, 2003; Solomon, 1988) (indication 4).
Given the malleability of emotion assumed in the weak constructivist approach, “it is clear that emotions can and are meant to
fulfill important functions in the reproduction of the collectivity,
both in terms of limiting undesirable behavior and encouraging
the wider endorsement of the values defining the group’s identity”
(Mihai, 2014, pp. 39–40); thus, it is suggested that emotions can be
directed to “fit” with the ethico-political principles of a democratic
society.
In light of these assumptions, especially in relation to the
earlier question raised about the consequences of cultivating
agonistic emotions in the classroom, there is an important
insight emerging from Tryggvason’s (2018) analysis that could
further extend the discussion concerning the relevance of political
emotions in the classroom. This insight is that, at the end of the day,
all emotions are somehow politically relevant (Clarke, Hoggett, &
Thompson, 2006; Demertzis, 2013); this idea implies that political
emotions are unavoidably elements of citizenship education. This
also means that beyond the deliberative or agonistic ideals in the
classroom, political emotions are present in the classroom and thus
have to be engaged pedagogically. Therefore, a critical conceptualization of the entanglement between political emotions and certain
rules of pedagogical engagement in the classroom is necessary, if
educators wish to confront the consequences of choosing to
cultivate some political emotions (rather than others) without
resorting to ideology or propaganda (see Zembylas, 2014, 2015).

The Contribution of Affective Citizenship in the Debate
Between Agonists and Deliberators
The second perspective that I want to highlight in my response
focuses on using affective citizenship education to propose a
practical application that fuses agonistic and deliberative views. To
do this, I discuss first how affective citizenship literature informs
citizenship education and illuminates the debate between agonistic
and deliberative views; then, I conclude by arguing that affective
citizenship is an example of a fusion between agonism and
deliberation.
In her seminal article on affective citizenship, Fortier (2010)
used the term governing through affect to indicate the management
of affect for the purpose of community cohesion, namely, how the
state or other sites of disciplinary power (e.g., fellow citizens, social
and political organizations) prescribe what it means to be a “good
citizen.” Thus, there are certain affects, groups, and acts that are
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treated as desirable or undesirable depending on their influence on
cohesion (Fortier, 2010, p. 23). As Fortier (2010) explained: “The
‘affective subject’ becomes ‘affective citizen’ when its membership
to the ‘community’ is contingent on personal feelings and acts that
extend beyond the individual self [ . . . ] but which are also directed
towards the community’” (p. 22). In other words, membership to a
community becomes contingent on whether subjects direct their
feelings towards proper acts of citizenship. In her more recent
work, Fortier (2016) used the term acts of citizenship to refer “to
both institutional and individual practices of making citizens or
citizenship, including practices that seek to redefine, decenter
or even refuse citizenship” (p. 1039).
There are two important implications of using affective
citizenship literature as a point of departure to propose
that citizenship education ought to cultivate one kind of political
emotion or another. The first implication is that affective citizenship literature relocates debates of citizenship education so that
they explicitly recognize the web of practices that make acts of
citizenship promoted in the classroom “visible, audible, tangible
and knowable” (Mol, 2002, p. 33). This means, for example, paying
careful attention to the elicitation, circulation, and distribution
of certain emotions for and within a community in relation to the
codes of conduct of the “good” or “bad” affective citizens (Fortier,
2016). The affective citizenship literature teaches those of us in
citizenship education that the cultivation of political emotions is
inextricably linked to the forms of disciplinary and biopolitical
power constituted by certain educational policies and pedagogical
practices, namely, how students and teachers variously experience,
enact, interpret and feel these policies and practices. Fortier wrote:
Exploring affective citizenship requires focusing on its complex logic:
how the feelings that attach to citizenship are unevenly distributed
across gendered, racialized, sexualized, classed bodies—some citizens
feel safer than others; some citizens are deemed safer than
others—and, in turn, how subjects’ feelings about citizenship are not
equally valued—not all desires for citizenship are deemed equally
desirable. (2016, pp. 1041–1042)

This idea challenges educators in citizenship education to engage
students in questioning how various actors are engaged together
(e.g., deliberation) and in opposition to each other (e.g., agonism)
with political issues that are inevitably affective (Di Gregorio &
Merolli, 2016)—a learning process that might yield critical insights
into how certain attachments to citizenship that are cultivated can
facilitate but also erode emancipatory projects in citizenship
education. This point brings me to the second implication I want to
discuss here, namely, how affective citizenship may constitute an
example of a fusion between agonism and deliberation.
Affective citizenship literature illuminates the debate between
agonists and deliberators by highlighting that political discussions
in the classroom are not only bound up within state or other
disciplinary power relations but also (already) take place in the
context of certain affective attachments (Fortier, 2016). For
example, some feelings attach themselves to citizenship (e.g.,
belonging, pride, etc.); therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
certain acts and practices in or beyond the classroom (e.g.,
democracy & education, vol 26, n-o 1

inclusive or exclusive practices) can bring up such feelings
(Ahmed, 2014). In the context of citizenship education, this idea
implies that one needs to examine under which conditions
cultivating acts of solidarity, empathy, belonging, and struggles for
democratic freedom are relevant to citizenship: how ethically and
politically appropriate is it to “manage” such affective acts in the
classroom? Thus, encouraging students to deliberate or even
engage in acts of citizenship that are more inclusive (e.g., welcoming refugees and migrants) and challenge normative rules of
citizenship has important affective and political consequences that
need to be acknowledged and critically explored in the classroom.
Acknowledging these issues in the context of efforts to
assimilate agonism with deliberation in citizenship education can
provide a basis for renewing debates on the role of political
emotions in deliberative and/or agonistic education. Affective
citizenship, then, constitutes an example that fuses deliberation
and agonism, because it pays attention to both political emotions and the procedural framework through which diverse
opinions are enabled within a deliberative space (e.g., in the
classroom). Learning how to feel about citizenship, how to act and
feel as citizens, including how to protest as citizens or against terms
of citizenship that are exclusive to some people is “invariably
bound up with what we know about citizenship and its (failed)
promises, much of which is assumed and taken for granted”
(Fortier, 2016, p. 1041). Hence, the pedagogical or philosophical
approach used through which we learn about/from citizenship is
inextricably linked to affective citizenship and its challenges.
The above discussion implies that educators in citizenship
education need to cultivate pedagogical skills with which they
can navigate the ethical, political, and emotional challenges of
affective citizenship (Zembylas, 2014). Practically, this means
that teachers might require, for example: to develop the capacity
to expose and critique the entanglements of affective citizenship
and political emotions in the classroom; to become capable to
critically assess the politicization of affective citizenship and its
various manifestations; and to be able to anticipate what might
happen when certain political emotions are adopted and, most
importantly, how affective attachments to certain bodies (e.g.,
fear, resentment) might change. Engaging with the pedagogical
consequences of cultivating agonistic emotions or the deliberative principles for political discussions in the classroom goes
beyond a simple opposition between agonism and deliberation. It
requires critical insights and pedagogical skills into how affective
attachments to various citizenship ideals can be navigated
towards facilitating or crippling democratic and emancipatory
ethos.

Concluding Remarks
Tryggvason (2018) reiterated that the form citizenship education
should take to promote active democratic citizenship within the
frames of deliberation and agonism is essentially an open
question that needs to be further explored. In my response to
Tryggvason’s essay, I have attempted to delineate merely two
perspectives of this exploration that have to do with the relevance
of political emotions and the use of affective citizenship as an
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example of fusing deliberation and agonism. Enriching further
the theoretical and empirical understandings of political emotions and affective citizenship in relation to agonism and deliberation requires asking critical questions about how the
entanglement of power, politics and affect in citizenship education projects (deliberative and/or agonistic) can create openings
for transformation or bring closures to emancipatory acts of
citizenship. What a fusion of agonistic and deliberative perspectives offers through affective citizenship education is an open-
ended democratic project with both challenges and possibilities.
Perhaps the real strength of this fused account lies not in the form
of any solution but rather in that it provides a different way of
viewing and feeling exclusion, conflict and difference in learning
from/about citizenship.
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